Plato's Utoplanism: The Political Content of the Early Dialogues George Klosko
One reason the political theory of Plato's Republic is widel misunderstood is that its precise relationship to the political con tent of the early dialogues is not generally recognized. That the political views of the Republic are frequently misconstrued seem apparent. In recent years many scholars have argued that th ideal state put forward in the work is completely "utopian." This word is used in different senses, but the sense I will concentrate in this paper is its bearing upon questions of political reform. As use the term, a "utopian" political theory contains proposals that are not intended to be taken seriously in terms of political reform When I say that the ideal state discussed in the Republic is not a "utopian" as these scholars maintain, I mean that Plato designed i with political reform in mind, and that he thought seriously abou how to bring it into existence. This does not, however, imply th fhe ideal state is likely to be realized, or that Plato ever thought i
was, but only that Plato wished to bring it into existence an thought this was possible, should extraordinary good fortun bring the necessary conditions into existence.
Nevertheless, numerous scholars contest even these claims According to them the ideal state was never seriously considered in connection with political reform. Certain scholars argue th Plato designed it to serve (and only to serve) in his examination o justice. Others hold that it was constructed for basically satirical reasons, in order to express obliquely the limits of what Plat believed to be politically possible.' The purpose of this paper is to contest these claims and others like them. By examining some im portant aspects of the early dialogues and their relationship to the Republic, I will attempt to show that political reform was an important consideration throughout all these works.2 We will loo first, in sections three and four, at the vie espoused by the Socrates of the early dialogu psychological assumptions upon which it middle dialogues, in section five, we will th jection of these psychological views forced companying Socratic view of political re here that an all but explicit rejection of political reform is written into the central Finally, in section six, we will explore and c several scholars who have written on these I Since the bulk of this paper is given over to the political contents of the early dialogues, we must begin by discussing a number of complex difficulties associated with the interpretation of these works. These problems have been dealt with countless times in the voluminous classical literature, and so discussion here will be kept to a minimum. However, it should be noted that, because scholarly opinion on many of these issues is divided, the commentator cannot avoid taking sides in some heated debates. I wish to emphasize the fact that the positions I take on the two most important questions, namely, the Socratic problem and the development of Plato's thought, are widely held, and are probably the predominant ones in recent Plato scholarship. And so, even though I cannot defend my positions here in detail, they are eminently defensible. Many arguments in their favor will be cited, while I will also present various criticisms of proponents of opposing views.
The development of Plato's thought and the Socratic problem can be discussed together. The general consensus of scholars is that Plato's works can be divided into three groups, which were probably written at different periods in their author's career and are accordingly referred to as early, middle and late dialogues.3 Sophisticated stylometrical analysis allows the different dialogues to be located in these groups with some assurance. What is most important from our point of view are certain obvious differences between the early and middle works. The late works cannot be discussed in this paper, though I be would strongly support my overall
The early works are generally hig tions they depict are often Socratic interlocutors, frequently culmina These features set the works apart dogmatic cycle of middle dialogues posium, Republic and Phaedrus. The that this is because one of Plato's pu works was to depict the character concern which became less central in the middle works. This is confirmed by the fact that the literary genre "Socratic dialogue" apparently began as an outgrowth of attempts by students and associates of Socrates to capture something of his unique personal and philosophical style, by recording actual conversations in which he took part.6 These works are, accordingly, used by scholars as prime sources of evidence for the historical Socrates.
In order to avoid unnecessary controversy, I will base my discussion of the early works primarily on the following dialogues, in which the historical motive seems most apparent. For the purposes of this essay, then, these are the early dialogues: Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Protagoras and Hippias Minor. will also refer to aspects of other works -especially the Gorgias and Symposium-which directly discuss Socrates' character and activity, in clear reference to the unique character and activity of the Socrates Plato knew.7
Because Plato uses the early dialogues to present something of the Socrates he knew, the philosophical content of these works is distinct from that of the middle dialogues-in which he uses J4 . Gould, The Development of Plato's Ethics (Cambridge, 1955) , is especially effective in showing the tremendous differences between the moral views of the early dialogues and the Laws.
5 As Guthrie says, in the early dialogues, "it may be claimed that Plato is imaginatively recalling in form and substance the conversations of his master without as yet adding to them any distinctive doctrines of his own" (History, 4:67). The position on the Socratic problem taken in this paper relies heavily on the evidence of Aristotle in order to identify the "historical" Socrates. However, it is less frequently noted that other views held by the Socrates of the early works coincide with our other evidence concerning (the historical) Socrates. In the following pages, w will examine the close relationship between the ethical views o the Socrates of the early dialogues and those attributed to Socrates by Aristotle -and Xenophon as well.
II
Before examining the political content of the early works, we should say something about the kinds of matters we take political discussion to be concerned with. Though I do not believe tha much is to be gained by insisting on some particular narrow construal, it should be helpful for us briefly to discuss the political, in light of the fact that the political content of the early dialogues wil be seen to be political in a somewhat unusual way.
In order to avoid undue controversy, I begin with a straightforward definition, taken from The Concise Oxford Dictionary. "Political" here is defined as "of the state or its 
III
Before we examine Socrates' views on political reform, we must discuss one additional matter. Socrates' view of politic reform has as its theoretical underpinning a distinctive psychological view. It is especially important that we examine th " Ibid. 12 Note especially Aristotle's smooth transition between the Nicomach Ethics and the Politics in EN, bk. 10, chap. 9 (discussed below, in section 13 As Aristotle says, a constitution (politeia) is the way of life (bios) of a ci body (Pol 1295a40-1295bl), in addition to being an arrangement of the state fices (1278a8-10, 1289a15-16, etc.).
in detail because it is widely distorted a analyses of the ethical content of the ea look first at Aristotle's evidence, which views of Socrates in the early dialogues.
To put matters as simply as possible evidence is that Socrates had an extre tualistic conception of human nature.
forcefully in the (probably pseudo-Aris According to Socrates, all the virtues aris the soul, from which it follows that in m branches of knowledge, he ignores the ir and thus ignores passion and the moral These lines are compressed. In order is saying, we must give a specific co judges"; that is, we must say what a from doing wrong. In the continuat we see that Socrates' view is that "no It seems clear that a philosopher with views on moral psychology such as those Aristotle ascribes to Socrates would not fare well as a moral reformer. In the following pages we will see that the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues held similar views and, accordingly, did not fare well. We will also see that this had considerable influence upon the development of Plato's political thought.
IV
A number of political ideas are associated with Socrates and are often presented as his contribution to political thought.23 I think it can be shown, however, that his real interest as a political figure, if not exactly a political thinker, lay in another direction. It is a well-attested fact, and one frequently discussed in the early dialogues, that Socrates largely exempted himself from the Athenian political process that was so much a part of his fellow citizens' lives. Though he fulfilled the duties of his citizenship and performed military service in th though on one occasion he secured and fought to defend the laws of general attitude to Athenian politics during one incident discussed in t counts that when the Thirty seized to implicate as many in their crime other men were ordered illegally t Socrates' reaction was typical: "the but I simply went home" (Ap 32d).
In general Socrates had as litt The key to Socrates' alternative most central teaching-is also cont penetrate beyond Socrates' familiar mission, intended to unveil the ignor can detect the gist of his moral mes follows (addressing the jury of his f I shall never give up philosophy or st out the truth to any one of you whom customed way: "Most excellent man Athens, the greatest of cities and the power, not ashamed to care for the reputation and honor, when you neith wisdom and truth and the perfection And again:
For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old alike, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much (30ab). Our second point is that Socrates' m private capacity. As we have seen, So ordinary political affairs or political in the existing political system was hopel his mission in a private capacity. We m Socrates was able to avoid the world of as he conceived his mission, it did not tional political means. The means he the Apology, consisted of reasoning wi urging them. At one point in the Apol taking his fellow citizens aside "indiv elder brother" (Ap 31b), urging each to this private, exhortative capacity that work of awakening his fellow citizens t souls.
If, as this paper contests, this was in fact the means through which Socrates pursued his mission of moral reform, that mission was political in a somewhat unusua political objective, the moral reform o recourse to political means. And so it aspect of the political content of th recognized.
At first sight it would appear that Socrates' practice of taking people aside and urging them to care for virtue was not an especially promising political strategy. But the pessimistic assessment that most people would doubtless render was, for Socrates, tempered by his intellectualistic conception of human nature. The
Socrates of Plato's early dialogues shares the views concerning moral psychology that are attributed to Socrates by Aristotle.
Though a point-by-point comparison between Plato's Socrates and Aristotle's could be presented, this is not necessary here. A good deal of evidence concerning the intellectualism of the early dialogues is presented in the next section (see below, section five).28
For our present purposes it is enough to examine one specific argument, the long and elaborate final argument of the Protagoras. 29 This argument is especially useful for our purposes because it contains the fullest single statement of Socrates' moral psychology found in the early dialogues. In addition, as we have noted, it is explicitly referred to by Aristotle in his discussion of moral weakness in book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics. The subject of the argument in the Protagoras too is moral weakness, and it can be seen that the view expressed here corresponds to that attributed to Socrates by Aristotle. 30 The final argument of the Protagoras is lengthy and complex. For reasons of space it cannot be analyzed here in depth, though certain of its basic features must be looked at. What really happens, Socrates asserts, is that the subject is deceived by the nearness of a lesser pleasure and incorrectly take it to be larger than another though more distant pleasure, which i actually larger. There can be no other reason why the subject Socrates' political practice, then, amounts to a new kind of politics. Every individual has a rational soul, and so every individual can be awakened to become morally autonomous and to rule himself. Socrates devotes his life to a sustained attempt to waken his fellow citizens to his conception of the virtues of the soul, to a life devoted to reason and moral autonomy. To get his fellow citizens to pursue this greatest good for man is the goal of his mission.
It seems, then, that though the belief that rational argument alone is a suitable instrument of political reform is a peculiar one, Socrates' psychological views allow him to hold it. There can be no doubt that Socrates believes in the efficacy of rational persuasion. Not only does this shine through his description of his mission in the Apology, but he devotes his life to putting it into practice. As Burnet says, the fact that Aristophanes utilizes Socrates as the arch-Sophist in the Clouds is a strong indication that, at the time the Clouds was first produced, in 423, (the historical) Socrates was already a familiar figure in Athens, and hence, that Socrates' mission most probably started some years before. 37 Thus for some thirty-or-so years Socrates pursued his mission of reforming the Athenians through arguments. This is the mission through which 34 See note 28, above. According to Xenophon's Socrates, knowing the definition of justice will have the following result: "Juries will cease to split their vote; citizens will stop wrangling, going to court, and raising revolts in the cause of justice. States will cease to differ about what is just, and cease to make war" (Mem IV, iv, 8; Benjamin, trans.).
35 For the kind of factors that Socrates overlooks, see the criticism of Aristotle, below, section 5.
36 Ap 29d, 30a, 30e-31a, 36c, 33ab.
37 Burnet, "The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul," pp. 238-40. This is taken for granted in the Apology, where Socrates alludes to the Clouds (19c).
Plato most probably met Socrates. It depicts in many dialogues, and the phil which he presents in the Apology. The tributing to Socrates the theory of mor essay is the fact that he spent several de to implement it.
Various objections could be raised Socrates' political theory. For instanc Socrates would have had no reason to re is, it could be argued that, though So means, he would have had no reason no But, aside from the fact that there is n of the early dialogues-or the historic ter-ever considered the use of coercion to achieve moral reform,38 a good case could be made that various doct does hold strongly suggest that he is in principle opposed means. First, the fact that in the Crito (51bc) Socrates ar it is never right to resist the commands of one's state one's soul and the weight Socrates places on moral au that each person must examine his own life (esp. Ap 38a), rest well with advocating coercive means to achieve th light of the paucity of our information concerning exact Socrates means by "caring for the soul,"40 it is not po demonstrate that this is logically incompatible with all means. But, still, in light of the lack of evidence to the c this again creates a presumption that Socrates wou opposed the use of coercion to attain his ends.
Though in light of the character of the evidence it is dif ascertain the kind of political organization Socrates was u ly aiming at, the Apology clearly indicates that he was at to reform his city as a whole.4' In a which Socrates aspired, the important kind of political tactics he pursued. S his city indirectly by reforming the And I believe that Cornford is right ideal was a collectivity of free, auton
plicitly Socrates was what we would Cornford also notes, it was left to A the Stoics to follow up the implica thought. Though they limited their i for the wise, it was to be a state with wise are perfect, the state they are f Aristotle's own position is that good habits and good character take hold best when they are inculcated from a very early age This, practically speaking, requires that the young be brought up according to good laws in a properly governed state (1179b31 ff.). Accordingly, Aristotle argues that the inculcation of virtue is ajob best left to the state (1180a5 ff.). And so Aristotle's view is, in a nutshell, if people are to be receptive to moral reasoning, they must be made receptive. This requires habituation, which requires compulsion, which requires laws, and hence, the state. If such matters are neglected by the state, it is up to the individual to do whatever he can to help whomever he can (1180a24-31), but
given the foregoing, it is argued that the individual will be most effective if he makes himself skilled in legislation (see 1180a32-34).
Arguments alone have been shown not to work, and so the in- To begin with, it is important to note that the tripartite soul is introduced in the Republic through an argument that only such a view can account for the common experience of psychological conflict (Rep 435e-441c). The analyses presented in the Phaedo and Phaedrus also explain the phenomenon of conflict, whether competition between the soul and the desires of the body, as in the Phaedo (65a-69c, 80e-84b), or, more graphically, between the charioteer (reason) and the unruly horse of desire, in the Phaedrus (253c-254c). The doctrine, as presented in all these works, represents a coherent body of thought that completely supersedes the Socratic account of moral weakness in the Protagoras. As we have seen, Socrates is able to argue that knowledge alone is sufficient for virtue. Plato, on the other hand, realizes that other factors must be taken into consideration, and the nonrational factors .. to preserve this belief and not to lose it when one is in pain, beset by pleasures and desires, and by fears" (429cd). Whereas, in the Charmides, Socrates attempts a number of definitions of temperance, none of which depends on a relationship between reason and desire,49 in the Phaedo temperance consists of "not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemly way" (68c). In the Republic temperance is "a certain orderliness . . and mastery over certain pleasures and appetites" (430e). It is safe to say that, in light of this account of temperance, Plato would have found the analysis of moral weakness in the Protagoras to be wrongheaded at best.s0 As for justice, Plato of course describes it in the Republic as that condition in which each part of the soul stays in its proper place and does its own job. In the soul of the just man, reason dictates to the two lower parts, keeping appetite in place with the aid of thumos (442ab), and on the whole the essence of Plato's account of justice is psychological harmony (443c-e). According to Plato's middle works, some semblance of this psychological order is a necessary condition for virtue. Knowledge or correct opinion alone is not 47 The distinction between knowledge and correct opinion is introduced in the Meno (97a ff.).
48 See Lach 194d-95a; Prt 357b-60e; cf. Aristotle EN 1116b3-5; EE 1229a14-16, 1230a7-10; MM 1190b27-29; and also Xen Mem IV, vi, 11. enough, and so we have here, at leas later dialogues-the Sophist and T Plato distinguishes between two ki norance, while the other is due t soul. 51
Because Plato believes that virtue requires a proper order of the three parts of the soul in addition to knowledge (or correct opinion), he advocates a program of education in the Republic far removed from anything seen in the early dialogues.52 According to Plato, this necessary psychic order-which constitutes the virtue of the lower classes in the state, and the necessary prerequisite for the higher virtue of the third class -must be given to the individual through the effects of his environment, before he is capable of grasping moral truths through reason (see esp. Rep 401a-402a). It is clear that, in the Republic, Plato is well along the road to his position in the Laws, according to which the process of educating the individual must begin before birth.53
In keeping with these developments in his moral psychology, Plato rejects the Socratic political position. The ordinary individual, as depicted in the Republic, is far from being entirely rational. It is clear that his moral beliefs are not the result of conscious decision, but are somehow rooted in the order of his soul. The precise connections between one's psychic order and the contents of his beliefs are never explicitly discussed by Plato, and the details need not concern us. What is important is Plato's insistence that the soul of the individual is decisively influenced by his society. As books 8 and 9 of the Republic graphically depict, the order of the individual's soul comes to mirror the moral makeup of his city.54 And in keeping with this we have Plato's view that the ordinary individual's opinions and beliefs are also the product of his environment.
Because Plato holds these basic psychological Because it is necessary to distinguish the " Republic (and the other middle works) from the " early dialogues, throughout the remainder of this use the convention, Socrates, to refer to the form Socrates' analysis here is based on a fundamental ciple: the great effects of the environment upon of every living thing. A given nature -and in this is with human nature -will be able to realize its po is brought up in a healthful environment, while i vironment it will be ruined. Since, as Socrates nature of the true philosopher is outstanding in e it is corrupted by the conditions in actual societie ends up prodigiously bad (Rep 492a). According force that is mainly responsible for this is pub Demos irresistibly shapes the inhabitants of a city age: "There is not, has never been, and will nev character different (from the many) in respect of been educated on principles opposed to theirs" ( It follows from this principle and its implicati must believe a mission such as Socrates' to be foredoomed to failure. The irresistible force of the mob cannot be oppose single individual. Indeed, the mob must win the battle for of even the potential philosopher, whose natural qualiti him particularly suited to the pull of reason. These very q lead to his undoing. Because of his natural superiority around him would seek to utilize hi would flatter and pander to him, and Such a man is not easily saved. If so and tell him the truth about the wretchedness of his condition and how he could acquire true virtue, there is no chance that he would listen (494d). Even if he could be influenced initially, that would not be the end of the matter. Those people wishing to use him, infuriated at the thought of losing him, would go to great lengths to make sure the persuader would not succeed. They would go so far as to bring the persuader to court to prevent him from winning the youth over (494de). For all readers of the Republic, the fate of the historical Socrates is there to remind them how vulnerable the philosophic reformer is.
As the philosopher is unable to convince his individual subject in book 6, he fares no better in confronting society as a whole, in a well-known passage in book 7. Describing what would happen if the prisoner, who had been freed from the cave and seen the light,55 were to return in order to aid his former fellows, Plato writes: "As for the man who tried to free them and lead them upward, if they could somehow lay their hands on him and kill him, they would do so" (517a).
Returning to the exegesis of the parable of the ship of state, we have Plato's recommendation for those philosophers who do survive in corrupt societies. Their role is not to be a public one; they are to avoid politics altogether. For Plato, the true philosopher "keeps quiet and minds his own business": "Like a man who takes refuge under a small wall from a storm of dust and hail driven by the wind, and seeing other men filled with lawlessness, the philosopher is satisfied if he can somehow live his present life free from injustice and impious deeds and depart from it with a beautiful hope, blameless and content" (496de).
Thus Plato realizes that the philosopher is powerless to persuade the corrupted individuals of a corrupt society to care for virtue. He is aware of the full complexity of human nature and believes that the philosopher cannot hope to achieve his ends without recourse to political power. And so the philosopher must seek to control the state, while the unity of political power and philosophical wisdom in the person of the philosopher-king marks the decisive rejection of the political view expressed in the early Socrates called his inquiries a quest for the "true political skill."73
Strauss's rendering of this line is unfortunate, for two reasons. First, ErtXEaEpv, the Greek word he translates as "quest," actually connotes "to attempt" much more than "to search for."74 Thus, more properly translated, in this line Socrates describes his mission as practice of the true political skill. This is confirmed in the continuation of the line, which Strauss does not cite. For Socrates explicitly says of this political skill that he prattein ta politika, "puts it into practice" (as Helmbold and Hamilton translate this).75 Prattein (to do) is the verb from which comes the word praxis, which, of course, is generally placed in opposition to theory, contemplation, alone. And so it seems that this line, which Strauss cites as evidence of Socrates' abstention from political participation, actually provides strong evidence of quite the opposite.
It seems to me that Strauss assimilates the Socrates of the Apology and the other early dialogues to the philosopher in the co rupt city described in Republic, book 6, who flees from all politic activity. This, of course, strikes me as wrongheaded, for as w have seen, the latter view is the all but explicit rejection of t former. I believe that only some misunderstanding of this ki To avoid the erroneous interpreta presented by Strauss and Bloom-and the discussed in the section as well-it is nece they make in interpreting the politic dialogues. For--as has been traditional have argued elsewhere"77-the ideal state p is designed to be brought into existence.
undoubtedly "utopian" in the sense th probably never be realized, it is not simp the imaginary to project the ideal."'78 The in two other senses: (1) Plato is interested he is fully aware of many of the obstacle In regard to the latter, as we have se Republic is far superior to that of Socrat treme intellectualism and his accom arguments alone as a means of reform, P truth that political reform requires polit be seen that Plato's rejection of the Socrat to the criticism of the views of their pre much more notorious apostles of radical r Manifesto, Marx and Engels describe t socialists" as follows:
... they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel.
And again:
Future history resolves itself, in their eyes, into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their social plans.79 76 
